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BETWEEN THE CEILING AND THE FLOOR: MAKING THE
CASE FOR REQUIRED DISCLOSURE OF HIGH-LOW
AGREEMENTS TO JURIES
Richard Lorren Jolly*
Parties are increasingly using high-low agreements to limit the risks of litigation.
High-low agreements are contracts in which defendants agree to pay plaintiffs a
minimum recovery in return for plaintiffs’ agreement not to execute on a jury
award above a maximum amount. Currently no jurisdiction requires high-low
agreements to be disclosed to the jury. This Note argues that disclosure should be
required. It contends that non-disclosed high-low agreements are a type of procedu-
ral contract modifying the jury’s core adjudicative function. Drawing on theories of
procedural justice, it suggests that by usurping the jury’s role these agreements un-
dermine the legitimacy of the judicial system. It contends that requiring disclosure
would remedy these negative effects and that any unintended consequences attend-
ant to disclosure could be mitigated by the court or by the parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Litigation is a risky business. Caught between soaring court costs
and unpredictable jury awards, litigants have sought creative ways to
limit liability. One such method is the use of high-low agreements.
A high-low agreement is defined as “[a] settlement in which a de-
fendant agrees to pay the plaintiff a minimum recovery in return
for the plaintiff’s agreement to accept a maximum amount regard-
less of the outcome of the trial.”1 In effect, “the defendant is
‘buying’ the right to be free from the worry of an adverse jackpot
jury verdict . . . [while] [t]he plaintiff is selling its lottery ticket in
exchange for the certainty that it will recover no less than the low
amount.”2 High-low agreements have been used since at least 19683
and have been growing in popularity over the last thirty years.4
They are employed mostly in tort litigation involving potentially
large damages and uncertain liability.5 The legal community has
widely and enthusiastically welcomed high-low agreements for their
ability to promote finality, certainty, and efficiency in the resolution
of disputes.6
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
2. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 496 (2007).
3. See Robert Coulson, Negotiating Control Contracts: Trial Counsel Reduce Their Need for
Appeals, 52 JUDICATURE 190, 192–93 (1968) (referring to high-low agreements as “control
contracts”).
4. Some have estimated that high-low agreements are discussed in twenty to thirty per-
cent of jury trial cases and implemented in ten percent. See Molly McDonough, High-Lows’
Ups and Downs, 91 A.B.A. J. 12, 12 (Aug. 2005) (citing Cook County Circuit Judge Richard J.
Elrod).
5. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 61–62 (1996); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-financing
Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 196 (2001) (arguing that high-low agreements are “a
staple not of bet-the industry class action but of run-of-the-mill tort litigation”).
6. See, e.g., Thompson v. T.J. Whipple Const. Co., 985 A.2d 221, 229 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2009) (“Court, counsel, and litigants favor [high-low agreements]. . . .”); Steven R. Gabel,
High/Low Settlement Agreements: Method for Dispute Resolution, 73 MICH. B.  J. 74, 74–75 (1994)
(“[High-low] agreement[s] promote[ ] finality, certainty, ease of administration and a de-
gree of comfort for the parties to the agreement[s].”); J.J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert
H. Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 57 J.L. & ECON. 699, 701 (2015)
(arguing that high-low can serve “litigants’ joint interests by limiting risk exposure at trial—
thereby reducing the risk premiums they bear—while still allowing them to benefit from
their confidence in their own cases”).
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Yet despite this enthusiasm, high-low agreements can have signif-
icant adverse consequences. Consider the following: In 2003,
William Jameson was eighty-two years old and suffering from pros-
tate cancer.7 He sought treatment at the Hope Oncology clinic in
Richardson, Texas.8 Due to a series of purported clerical errors,
Jameson received two doses of a highly toxic chemotherapy medica-
tion, which lead to his death.9 His family brought a medical
malpractice suit against the clinic.10 Shortly after the trial began,
the parties executed a high-low agreement that guaranteed the fam-
ily a payout of $200,000 and limited the maximum potential award
to $1,000,000.11 If the jury returned a verdict between these two
values, the high-low agreement would not alter the award and the
family would receive the amount awarded by the jury. After deliber-
ating for five days, the jury found in favor of the family and awarded
them an astounding $606,000,000.12 Despite the jury’s determina-
tion, the clinic paid the family only the $1,000,000 mandated by the
high-low agreement.13
By entering into the high-low agreement, the family and the
clinic modified the scope of their dispute in order to limit their
liability exposure. The twelve Texas jurors who decided the case,
however, were not made aware of this modification or of the precise
role they were playing in resolving the remaining dispute. The ju-
rors believed that they were performing their civic duty of assessing
fault and compensation based on factual determinations, while in-
stead the parties had secretly tasked them with determining what
the value of the dispute would be if it were not in fact constrained
by the high-low agreement. Thus, the jurors did not adjudicate the
actual dispute between the family and the clinic—a dispute that
concerned only those potential awards remaining between the high
and low parameters. Rather, the jury supplied a hypothetical valua-
tion, which the parties then applied to their contingent agreement.
This substantial reformation of the jury’s procedural role was not
revealed to the jurors because, like all other United States jurisdic-
tions, Texas does not require parties to disclose the existence of





11. See Natalie White, Overdose of Chemotherapy Meds Leads To $606 Million Verdict: High-
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high-low agreements.14 This is because non-disclosed high-low
agreements have been misunderstood as settlement agreements,
which ordinarily may remain private.15 Consequently, no court or
commenter has addressed the procedural implications and negative
effects that non-disclosure of high-low agreements have on jurors
and on the jury as an institution.
This Note argues that disclosure of high-low agreements to juries
should be required. It contends that when left undisclosed, high-
low agreements are procedural contracts that secretly transform the
jury’s adjudicative function and compromise judicial legitimacy.
Once they are disclosed, however, high-low agreements simply de-
marcate the boundaries of the dispute, leaving undisturbed the
jury’s traditional responsibilities. Part I provides a background on
litigants’ broad autonomy and constraints in shaping litigation
through procedural contracts. It also explores the jury’s traditional
role in resolving disputes and the benefits flowing from juror partic-
ipation. Part II argues that non-disclosed high-low agreements
should be understood primarily as procedural contracts that alter
the jury’s role in administering justice and, in so doing, undermine
the integrity of the judicial system. It then differentiates non-dis-
closed high-low agreements from deceptively similar procedures
that do not pose the same systemic hazards. Part III recommends
that in order to preserve judicial legitimacy courts should require
parties to disclose the existence and terms of high-low agreements.
It emphasizes that disclosed agreements are distinct from non-dis-
closed agreements in that they do not alter the procedural function
of the jury. It then addresses some of the negative consequences of
requiring disclosure and concludes that they can be mitigated by
courts and by the parties themselves. Finally, this Note contends
that even if these mitigation techniques are ineffective disclosure
should be required because it promotes judicial resourcefulness.
14. See Luis F. Collins, Admissibility of High/Low Settlements, FLA. B. J. 35, 38 (1993) (assert-
ing that high-low agreements between two parties are inadmissible); Prescott et al., supra note
6, at 701–02 n. 6 (stating that disclosure of high-low agreements “is not a codified require-
ment in any jurisdiction”). A key exception to this rule is found in the handful of
jurisdictions which require disclosure in multi-party litigation when the high-low agreement
exists between fewer than all of the participating parties. In this limited circumstance, high-
low agreements are likened to Mary Carter agreements. That is, high-low agreements may be
used to diminish the liability of one of the defendants proportionately to increases in the
liability of the codefendants, thereby undermining the adversarial process. See, e.g., State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thorne, 110 So. 3d 66, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Freed v.
Salas, 780 N.W.2d 844, 857 (Mich. App. 2009); In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig. v.
Amchem Products Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 717, 721 (N.Y. 2007).
15. See infra note 73; San I. Wesburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An
Economic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55 (1999) (noting that courts generally defer to
parties’ settlements except in very specific and limited circumstances).
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I. A BACKGROUND ON PROCEDURAL CONTRACTS AND THE CIVIL JURY
To understand how non-disclosed high-low agreements uniquely
undermine judicial legitimacy and why it is critical that they be dis-
closed to juries, it is necessary to situate our discussion in terms of
both the litigants’ procedural autonomy and the civil jury’s func-
tion and purpose. Accordingly, Section I-A outlines courts’
increasing willingness to enforce private procedural modifications
to traditional public adjudication. It emphasizes that although par-
ties enjoy broad autonomy in shaping procedure, they are
nevertheless constrained by overriding institutional interests. Sec-
tion I-B provides an overview of the complex and multifaceted role
of the civil jury. It presents the civil jury not merely as an adminis-
trative mechanism for the fair and accurate resolution of public
disputes, but also as a celebrated political and social institution.
A. Litigants Possess Increasing Autonomy in
Crafting Procedural Contracts
Litigants enjoy broad autonomy to shape the procedures gov-
erning their litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
parties to modify a wide-range of procedural actions and are in-
creasingly viewed as default rules around which parties may
contract.16 And over the last half-century, courts have been gradu-
ally willing to implement privately crafted procedures that push well
beyond those outlined by the Federal Rules.17 However, despite
these developments, litigants’ procedural autonomy remains con-
strained by overriding institutional interests—interests that non-
disclosed high-low agreements compromise.
Courts have not always entertained private agreements modifying
civil procedure. English courts going back to at least the sixteenth
century declined to enforce arbitration agreements because they
impermissibly “oust[ed]” courts of their jurisdiction.18 This historic
hostility to private modifications migrated with common law from
16. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008); Henry S. Noyes, If
You (Re)build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 622 (2007).
17. See Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1140
(2006).
18. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746) (noting that party agreements
cannot oust courts of their jurisdiction); see also Vynior’s Case, 8a, 81b, (1609) (Lord Coke
noting in dictum that agreements for arbitration are specifically unenforceable.).
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England to the United States.19 Early American courts justified their
inherited antipathy on both party-centric and institutional
grounds.20 For instance, the Supreme Court stressed litigants’ due
process rights when it refused to enforce an agreement not to seek
removal to federal court, stating that access to the public courts was
a “substantial right” that an individual could not “barter away” in
advance.21 And in declining to enforce a choice of forum agree-
ment, the Massachusetts Supreme Court emphasized the primacy of
the judiciary, stating that where actions may be brought is fixed by
law “upon considerations of general convenience and expedi-
ency.”22 The Massachusetts court further noted that such private
agreements challenge the competency and integrity of the judiciary
and have the potential to bring “the administration of justice into
disrepute.”23 These kinds of holdings were common, such that
through much of American history courts rejected even the most
dickered-over procedural contracts.24
During the early twentieth century, however, courts’ dual con-
cerns over imprudent contracts and securing judicial primacy
began to slacken. Commercial actors increasingly desired the con-
venience of private arbitration and, along with the American Bar
Association, lobbied legislatures to overrule the courts’ longstand-
ing policies.25 This successful campaign culminated in the adoption
of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925.26 Although the Act
only ensured the validity of arbitration clauses in federal courts, it
nevertheless marked the beginning of an era of judicial openness to
private procedural modifications.27 Over the next several decades,
19. See H. JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT TO ACCOMPANY 646: TO VALIDATE CERTAIN AGREE-
MENTS FOR ARBITRATION, H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“[T]he jealousy of the English
courts for their own jurisdiction . . . survived for so lon [sic] a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the Ameri-
can courts.”).
20. David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses
in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 995 (2008).
21. Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874).
22. Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174, 184 (1856).
23. Id.
24. Admiralty courts are a key exception to this general rule. See Marcus, supra note 20,
at 978.
25. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. REV. 605, 613 (2010); see also, Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (noting that a federal act would be necessary if arbitration agreements were
to be enforced at the federal level).
26. 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (later renamed the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. §§1–16
(2006)).
27. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 20, at 1042 (“The era of contract procedure arguably
dawned with forum selection clauses.”).
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courts began to emphasize litigants’ freedom of contract while en-
forcing waivers of due process rights.28 Then in 1972, the Supreme
Court declared that the fear of parties ousting courts of their juris-
diction was “hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.”29 The Court
reasoned that rather than being divested of their jurisdiction,
courts were simply refraining from exercising their power in order
to give effect to the parties’ contract-backed expectations.30 Thus,
by the close of the twentieth century, “ancient concepts of freedom
of contract”31 had freed parties to commoditize and exchange pro-
cedural goods.
Today, courts routinely entertain litigants’ procedural con-
tracts.32 Litigation increasingly advances according to privately
crafted “mini-codes of civil procedure”33 and parties are free to se-
lect rule systems through choice of forum and arbitration clauses.34
Indeed, the embrace of privately crafted procedure has been so ex-
tensive that some scholars argue that an adjudicative framework
based on party consent, rather than administrative due process, has
become “the preferable modality for conflict resolution.”35 Notwith-
standing these developments, there is little case law on procedural
rulemaking and no clear legislative or judicial direction on how to
cabin litigants’ procedural autonomy.36 Some scholars have even
suggested that parties might freely choose procedural arrange-
ments that are entirely inconsistent with the official rules.37 Others
argue that such a high level of procedural control supports just out-
comes and procedural efficiency by allowing the parties to
28. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (acknowledging it
had become settled law that parties may freely enter into an array of procedural agreements).
29. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
30. Id. This holding was later extended to unsophisticated consumer contracts. See Car-
nival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991).
31. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11.
32. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 737
(2011) (noting the courts’ “broad embrace of private ordering”).
33. See Horton, supra note 25, at 607 (“Rather than the government, private actors cre-
ate procedural rules . . . [a]nd rather than marching in lockstep, cases follow their own ‘mini-
codes of civil procedure.’ ”).
34. See Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342–43 (2012).
35. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1140 (2006);
see also David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of
Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085,
1113 (2002) (noting that “civil procedure has taken a backseat to contract.”).
36. E.g., Bone, supra note 34, at 1351; Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for
Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 513 (2011); Judith Resnik, Procedure As Contract, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 627 (2005).
37. See Bone, supra note 34, at 1339.
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determine and assign risk.38 Through their exchange, these schol-
ars claim, procedural goods attain value and generate potential for
creative and efficient negotiations.39
Despite this enthusiasm for an unbound procedural system,
there are certainly some limitations on litigants’ procedural auton-
omy. Procedural modifications are contracts and thus are governed
by traditional notions of contract law,40 including public policy con-
cerns with the potential to void them. This can be seen in the
treatment of forum selection clauses, where judges must weigh
party convenience against “those public-interest factors of systemic
integrity and fairness.”41 Likewise in other settings, the Supreme
Court has noted that “overriding procedural consideration[s]”
alone may invalidate parties’ arrangements.42 This language
stretches beyond due process concerns and suggests that parties
may not compromise the procedural integrity of the judiciary
through private agreements.43 Though the Supreme Court has not
had the opportunity to develop this point further, federal appellate
courts have contributed, for example, that parties may not contract
for a jury of “12 orangutans,”44 nor may they ask courts to settle a
dispute by “flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”45
Though neither of these fantastical limitations is particularly illumi-
nating, they suggest that overriding procedural considerations
implicate the judiciary’s procedural legitimacy.46 Contracts that po-
tentially compromise this legitimacy should be closely scrutinized.
38. See Moffitt, supra note 2, at 477; see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM. R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 94 (1988) (noting that “procedures that provide high
process control for disputants tend to enhance procedural fairness”).
39. Noyes, supra note 16, at 647.
40. Cf. Resnik, supra note 36, at 599 (“A good deal of contemporary doctrine on Con-
tract Procedure assumes the wholesale application of extant principles of contract law.”).
41. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988); see also Michael Karayanni,
The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1009,
1015–24 (1995) (overviewing the numerous public policy interests that generally apply in the
context of forum selection clauses).
42. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995) (upholding an agreement to
waive exclusionary provisions of plea-statement rules).
43. For an overview of courts’ different approaches to procedural contracts, see Noyes,
supra note 16, at 593.
44. United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).
45. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (“In general, I do not believe parties may impose on the federal courts burdens
and functions that Congress has withheld.”).
46. See Noyes, supra note 16, at 625 (noting that these cases suggest “the Court might be
concerned with keeping up appearances and therefore reject strange processes that make
the court look silly or incompetent.”).
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Non-disclosed high-low agreements compromise perceptions of ju-
dicial legitimacy by secretly manipulating the administrative role of
the civil jury.
B. The Civil Jury is an Administrative and Socio-Political Institution
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution en-
sures the right to a civil jury.47 The institution is likewise protected
in all fifty states.48 It is a historically celebrated institution, such that
William Blackstone described trial by jury three centuries ago as
“the glory of the English law.”49 And as recently as 2014, the Ninth
Circuit described it as among “the most important institutions of
self-governance.”50 The civil jury is well deserving of these protec-
tions and praise because of both its administrative functions and
socio-political significance. Non-disclosed high-low agreements un-
dermine both of these.
At its most fundamental, the civil jury is an administrative tool for
the fair and accurate resolution of public disputes. In accomplish-
ing this task, jurors have the sole responsibility of making factual
determinations by assessing the credibility of evidence and the con-
sequence of its weight.51 Additionally, since the earliest English
juries, damage calculations have always been peculiarly the prov-
ince of the jury.52 This is because the extent of damages suffered is
a question of fact, just like the jury’s determinations of causation or
fault.53 For example, assessing the damages of a standard breach of
contract involves not only determining the market value of the
goods or services, but also calculating the predicted lost profits, as
well as potentially normative determinations of good or bad-faith
47. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
48. Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1037, 1040 n.11 (1999) (“While the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, all of
the states have their own constitutional or statutory guarantees of a civil jury trial.”).
49. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 378 (4th ed. 1876).
50. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Lab., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that jurors may not be excluded based on sexual orientation).
51. See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON 460 (Thomas ed. 1818) (“Ad
questiones facti non respondent judices; ad qvestiones legis non respondent juratores”—Judges do not
answer questions of fact; juries do not answer questions of law.”).
52. See, e.g., JOHN DAWSON MAYNE, WOOD’S MAYNE ON DAMAGES § 791, at 739 (3d English
& 1st American ed. 1880); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 324 (“[T]he quantum of
damages . . . is a matter that cannot be done without the intervention of the jury.”).
53. See, e.g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437
(2001).
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breach.54 Juries make these assessments by drawing inferences from
their experiences and from the evidence presented. And, like all
other factual determinations, judges are generally prohibited from
reexamining a jury’s damage award. Damage calculations are thus a
natural part of the jury’s role as fact-finder.55
The civil jury is uniquely qualified to fulfill this adjudicative role.
Analysis based on the influential University of Chicago Jury Pro-
ject56 suggests that citizens are better able to apply common sense
and community norms than are judges.57 Though they are generally
untrained, their everyday experiences render citizen jurors knowl-
edgeable in common law issues such as the profile of negligence
and the pricing of damages.58 These issues often involve complex
value judgments and assessments of countless imprecise variables
that may not clearly lend themselves to economic appraisal. For in-
stance, calculating damages flowing from the pain and suffering of
the loss of reproductive ability requires a swath of factual considera-
tions and a sensitivity that is virtually impossible to encapsulate in a
legal standard.59 Jurors faced with this near hopeless calculus are
often only vaguely instructed by courts to use their “collective en-
lightened conscious” as a measuring stick.60 The judiciary is thus
reliant upon the civil jury’s expertise, insights, and institutional au-
thority in order to assure the fair and accurate administration of
justice.
Due in part to this central role in the judiciary, the civil jury has
been recognized as an important socio-political institution since the
earliest days of the Republic.61 In fact, the initial absence from the
Constitution of a guaranteed right to a civil jury trial was heavily
54. See Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative Power
and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 356–58 (1995) (outlining the different types of deter-
minations juries must make in awarding damages).
55. See id. at 357–60.
56. This mid-century project was the most ambitious empirical study of juries that had
ever been attempted, and its analysis and conclusions have effected scholarship and policy
for more than a generation. See, e.g.,  Edith Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process
of Decisionmaking, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.  225, 228 (1989) (“Data from the Chicago Jury
Project have withstood the test of time and have formed the foundation for much recent
debate about the competence of both criminal and civil juries.”).
57. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 158, 178 (1958).
58. Id. at 160.
59. See Greene, supra note 56, at 226.
60. See RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 321 (3d ed.
1993).
61. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969) (1835); Federal Farmer XV (Jan. 18, 1788).
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debated.62 Such contestation is unsurprising considering the obser-
vations of early sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville, who famously
recognized that the American “jury is, above all, a political institu-
tion.”63 This characterization highlights the democratic and
participatory role of the jury in administering and, thus, shaping
the nation’s laws.64 Though outright jury nullification—whereby a
jury acquits or finds a defendant not liable though they believe the
defendant committed the alleged conduct—is a controversial doc-
trine,65 in the routine administration of civil justice, the jury’s ability
to introduce a degree of flexibility to the rigid application of the
law is commonly accepted.66 In this way, the civil jury restrains gov-
ernment and other powerful parties by tying the judiciary to the
mast of the social conscience.
Beyond this important political role, the jury is also a unique so-
cializing institution. Jury duty is among the few affirmative and
compulsory obligations of citizenship67 and one of the only oppor-
tunities for laypeople to be involved in the process of administering
justice.68 For these reasons, Tocqueville described the civil jury as “a
gratuitous public school” that “instill[s] some of the habits of the
judicial mind into every citizen.”69 He argued that it “teaches every
man not to recoil before the responsibility of his own actions and
impresses him with that manly confidence without which no politi-
cal virtue can exist.”70 Many others coming before and after
Tocqueville expressed similar sentiments, recognizing that judicial
participation invests citizens in the just administration of laws and
in the general well-being of society.71 Indeed, as Plato warned more
than a millennium ago: “[I]n private suits . . . all should have a
62. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289, 295 (1966).
63. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 274.
64. Id.
65. For an overview of the jury’s law determining power and the nullification doctrine,
see Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL
DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES (1973).
66. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 494–95 (1966) (“The
jury in the guise of resolving doubts about the issues of fact, gives reign to its sense of
values.”).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (1994).
68. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 66, at 5 (describing jurors as a “transient, ever-
changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs.”).
69. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 274.
70. Id. at 295.
71. See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBERG, CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 236–37 (2d ed. 1874);
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 31–32 (1970) (discussing John
Stuart Mill on participation in political processes); Plato, Laws IV 768, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 528–29 (B. Jowett trans., Random House rev. ed. 1937); Sherman J. Clark, The Courage
of Our Convictions, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2381, 2382 (1999).
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share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice is apt
to imagine that he has no share in the State at all.”72 By secretly
constraining citizens’ procedural role, non-disclosed high-low
agreements undermine the judiciary and rob citizens of their share.
II. NON-DISCLOSURE OF HIGH-LOW AGREEMENTS COMPROMISES
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY
This Part contends that non-disclosed high-low agreements are
procedural contracts that manipulate the adjudicative role of the
jury and thereby compromise judicial legitimacy. Part II-A argues
that non-disclosed high-low agreements should be understood not
as settlements but as procedural contracts. These secret contracts
misrepresent the actual dispute between the parties and transform
the jury’s responsibilities. Part II-B asserts that the surreptitious ma-
nipulation of the jury’s adjudicative role may cause jurors to lose
trust and interest in the just administration of law, which in turn
compromises perceptions of judicial legitimacy and undercuts the
socio-political benefits of jury service. Finally, Part II-C contends
that because non-disclosed high-low agreements are a contractual
and secret manipulation, they pose unique harms not raised by
non-disclosure of seemingly similar procedures.
A. Non-Disclosed High-Low Agreements are Procedural Contracts
Judges and scholars alike have widely and routinely mischaracter-
ized non-disclosed high-low agreements as no more than private
settlements.73 This misunderstanding overlooks the substantial pro-
cedure-altering effects of their non-disclosure. Non-disclosed high-
low agreements should instead be understood as procedural con-
tracts modifying the jury’s adjudicative role. When undisclosed,
these contracts misrepresent the litigants’ actual dispute and task
the jury with resolving a controversy that does not genuinely exist.
72. Plato, supra note 71, at 529.
73. See, e.g. Barton v. Dep’t of Transp., 308 P.3d 597, 608 (Wash. 2013) (describing high-
low agreements as “a type of partial settlement agreement”); In re Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbes-
tos Litig. v. Amchem Products Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 717, 721 (2007) (“pre-trial settlements”); Gulf-
Industries Inc. v. Nair, 953 So.2 2d 590, 594 (Fla. App. Ct. 2007) (“a common form of settle-
ment”); Monti v. Wenkert, 947 A.2d 261, 272 (Conn. 2008) (“verdict contingent settlement
agreement”); Prescott et al., supra note 6, at 702 (a type of “partial settlement”); Yeazell, supra
note 5, at 214 (“a new form of settlement”). But see Moffitt, supra note 2, at 497 (describing
high-low agreements as “an option for extrajudicial customization of the litigation
experience”).
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The portrayal of non-disclosed high-low agreements as merely
private settlements is inappropriate. Settlements bring an end to
disputes without necessitating a full trial,74 whereas high-low agree-
ments require full adjudication by jury verdict. Appreciating this
point, some have construed non-disclosed high-low agreements as
partial or incomplete settlements.75 This is a more apt description,
but it applies only when the agreement is disclosed to the jury. By
entering into a high-low agreement, the parties partially settle their
dispute by limiting its scope to only those values remaining between
the agreed upon high and low parameters. When the agreement is
undisclosed, however, the ensuing adjudication is not likewise lim-
ited. Non-disclosed high-low agreements do not assure a restrained
proceeding because the parties still represent their dispute in its
original, unmodified entirety.76 It is therefore unfitting to refer to
non-disclosed high-low agreements as simply a type of settlement.
Moreover, this mischaracterization of non-disclosed high-low
agreements is more than a pedantic labeling concern. By misunder-
standing these agreements as private settlements, courts and
commenters have overlooked the substantial procedure-altering ef-
fects resulting from their non-disclosure. This oversight is due to
the fact that courts do not generally scrutinize settlement agree-
ments. Parties remain free to end their dispute at any time77 and
courts will defer to the parties’ decision except in very specific and
limited circumstances.78 Indeed, “the general rule” of settlements,
as Professor Sanford Wesburst quips, “is that there are no rules.”79
Therefore, effectively disguised as private settlements, non-dis-
closed high-low agreements have slipped by the watchmen almost
entirely unchallenged. This is a mistake.
Non-disclosed high-low agreements should instead be under-
stood as procedural contracts that modify the jury’s adjudicative
role. Though the parties have agreed in advance to limit the scope
of their dispute, they nevertheless present their case and request for
it to be resolved as if the possibilities of relief are boundless. This
fundamentally misrepresents the underlying dispute. The amount
74. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining settlement as “an agreement end-
ing a dispute or lawsuit”).
75. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 62; Prescott et al., supra note 6, at 702.
76. Though it is true that the parties to a high-low agreement may voluntarily restrain
their overall courtroom presentation relative to the expected recovery, this alone does not
assure a factually limited proceeding. Cf. Prescott et al., supra note 6, at 728–30 (arguing that
high-low agreements may reduce litigation costs by limiting the risks and potential rewards of
trial).
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
78. See Wesburst, supra note 15, at 55.
79. Id.
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of damages that a party has suffered is a key question of fact.80 It is
determined by calculating a constellation of imprecise factual vari-
ables into a single monetary award. High-low agreements are
settlements on the scope of this calculation. The parties essentially
agree that they do not dispute some undefined combination of
facts that would push the award beyond the high-low parameters.
The dispute as modified concerns only those calculations resulting
in an award falling between the ceiling and the floor, as all other
calculations are no longer in controversy.81 Thus, when the agree-
ment is not disclosed, the parties task the jury with determining the
hypothetical worth of the unmodified dispute, even though that dis-
pute no longer exists.82 This task is alien to the jury’s codified
procedural role of providing the fair and accurate resolution of
public disputes.
The jury’s procedural role thus becomes defined by the non-dis-
closed high-low agreement. If by coincidence the jury returns a
damage award that falls between the preset parameters, then the
high-low agreement has no noticeable consequence. The parties
simply accept the jury’s assessment of the nevertheless still misrep-
resented dispute. On the other hand, if the jury returns an award
that falls outside of the parameters, then the agreement takes effect
and the corresponding high or low value is awarded. In both of
these circumstances the jury renders a decision that effectuates an
end to the dispute. Critically, though, the jury’s decision does not
alone carry consequence and is considered only in relation to the
high-low agreement. That is, the jury’s decision acts merely to trig-
ger or fail to trigger the parties’ contingent contract. The jury’s
actions are thus unmoored from their effects, serving only a sepa-
rate and contractually defined purpose. This is a dramatic
procedural shift and one that carries detrimental consequences.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 51–55.
81. To make this point clearer, consider again William Jameson, the eighty-two year-old
man who died in the Texas oncology clinic. By entering into the high-low agreement, the
parties agreed that while the jury would remain free to consider the universe of relevant facts
in awarding damages (for instance: the pain experienced by Jameson’s grandchildren, or
that Jameson was elderly and already diagnosed with cancer), they would be constrained in
their calculation of those facts. Accordingly, the parties did not dispute every conceivable
calculation of variables, rather only those that would result in an award within the bounds of
the agreement. In this way, the high-low agreement framed, albeit imprecisely, what the par-
ties were litigating. It was the dispute itself.
82. This misrepresentation may even run afoul of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
which requires veracity in pleadings, and Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, which
requires candor toward the tribunal. These points will not be discussed here.
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B. Non-disclosed High-Low Agreements Undermine Procedural Legitimacy
Non-disclosed high-low agreements undermine judicial legiti-
macy by deceptively transforming the jury’s role in adjudicating
disputes. Research suggests that jury participation helps instill no-
tions of procedural justice in citizens, which plays a powerful role in
securing systemic legitimacy.83 Removing jurors’ decision-making
power and misleading them as to their procedural role could, over
time, result in a crisis of confidence in the judicial system. Jurors
may come to believe that their participation is illusory and accord-
ingly abdicate their difficult responsibilities. This would
compromise the worth of all jury verdicts while also reducing the
political and social benefits of the jury as an institution.
Procedural justice theory suggests that the legitimacy of a judicial
system is determined not by its objective qualities, but by the per-
ception of fairness in its processes.84 It recognizes that justice is an
ephemeral and socially constructed concept, existing only to the
extent that it is accepted by society.85 Many of the system’s proce-
dures are therefore designed to secure public recognition of
judicial legitimacy.86 Serving on a jury is a core example of a legiti-
macy-enhancing procedure. Research has shown that jury service
greatly affects citizens’ attitudes and confidence in the judicial sys-
tem.87 These attitudes are more likely to be positive when citizens
feel that they fully exercised their decision-making capacity in a
meaningful way; attitudes are more likely to be negative when citi-
zens feel that their time has been wasted.88 This empirical research
establishes what philosophers have long recognized: Directly partic-
ipating in the administration of laws awakens citizens’ confidence
in the judicial system.89
Non-disclosed high-low agreements challenge this confidence by
surreptitiously altering the jury’s procedural role. Though citizens
are often inexperienced in legal matters, surveys show that they
83. See, e.g., Shari Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who
Serve as Jurors, in ROBERT E. LITAN, VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 298 (1993).
84. For an overview of procedural justice literature, see E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 66–80 (1988).
85. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCH. 117,
117–18 (2000).
86. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1368–69 (1985).
87. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 67–80 (1975); Dia-
mond, supra note 83, at 285 (relying on jury surveys to assess the psychological effects and
satisfaction rates following jury service).
88. See Diamond, supra note 83, at 286–87.
89. See supra note 71.
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generally take their jury responsibilities seriously.90 This is true even
though jurors have described the decision-making process as “diffi-
cult, painful, [and] upsetting.”91 These descriptions are
understandable. Compelled by law and with limited instruction, ju-
rors are told to draw upon the social conscience, deliberate in a
face-to-face environment, and then direct the power of the state
against a community member.92 They are often tasked with translat-
ing immeasurable and tragic injuries into monetary awards. Jurors
put their lives on hold and may spend days enduring this civic duty
before earnestly returning their informed decision.93 But, when
parties utilize non-disclosed high-low agreements, the jury’s efforts
come to naught. They have been duped. Rather than resolving a
genuine dispute, the jurors have been pawns in the parties’ secret
arrangement. Even more problematic, by not requiring disclosure
the judiciary has been complacent in this charade. So, not only
have the jurors been cheated of their time, used for their expertise,
and deprived of their democratic accomplishment, they have also
been misled by an institution reliant on their perceptions for its
continued legitimacy.
Misleading jurors in this way has the potential to undermine the
legitimacy of all jury trials. According to the American Bar Associa-
tion, twenty-nine percent of the adult American population has
served on a jury.94 Furthermore, citizens share with each other their
positive and negative experiences of jury service.95 As the use of
non-disclosed high-low agreements increases,96 citizens are likely to
encounter them at some point through their own experiences,
hearsay, or media accounts. Without contrary evidence, jurors may
reasonably come to believe that parties routinely have secret mecha-
nisms for adjusting the verdicts that juries return.97 Viewing their
90. See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 66, at 3–11, 141–62 (1966); Diamond, supra note 83,
at 284.
91. Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures, A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of Jurors,
82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 484 (1997).
92. See Clark, supra note 71, at 2382 (articulating and celebrating the difficulty of jury
duty).
93. The average length of a civil jury trial is nearly four days. See LYNN LANTON & THOMAS
H. COHEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF
STATES COURTS, 2005, 8 (2005), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf.
94. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, AM. BAR ASSOC. JURY SERVICE: IS FULFILLING YOUR CIVIC DUTY
A TRIAL? (July 2004).
95. See Diamond, supra note 83, at 283.
96. See McDonough, supra note 4, at 12.
97. A not dissimilar phenomenon has been noted with jurors in cases likely involving
insurance coverage. Insurance is common and in fact legally required under certain circum-
stances. And despite evidentiary rules prohibiting admission of evidence proving or
disproving coverage, it is documented that jurors tend to assume the parties are insured and
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role as superfluous or impotent, jurors may reasonably choose to
abdicate their difficult responsibility and defer to these imagined
contracts.98 For example, why waste time and emotional energy in
calculating the precise value of a dignitary harm if the parties have
already agreed to a potential range of damages? Whether or not
such an agreement exists, that jurors may sensibly entertain this
supposition suggests that non-disclosed high-low agreements sour
the resolution of all public disputes, not just those in which they are
actually employed.99 The traditional means for the fair and accurate
administration of justice is thereby brought into disrepute.
Such juror abdication would also have negative social and politi-
cal consequences beyond the courthouse doors. The civil jury is a
celebrated institution in part because it imparts on citizens the
means of democratic rule.100 Through participation, jury service
teaches citizens to confront the democratic obligation of deliberat-
ing and delivering the communities’ shared conscious on some of
society’s most challenging issues.101 This heuristic exercise, how-
ever, only acquires its lauded significance when the jurors know
that their determination carries a real and actual effect. That is, the
jury is not simply a deliberative body, but one that must also take
responsibility for its decisions.102 It is by compelling jurors to shoul-
der the burden of passing judgment on their peers that the
institution imparts its emboldening social and political teachings.103
If jurors do not view their role as outcome determinative—and es-
pecially if their role is in fact only obliquely determinative, as is the
case with non-disclosed high-low agreements—their involvement in
the proceedings is without broader socio-political benefit. Juror
consider this assumption in calculating damage awards. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 201,
596 (1983); Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Top-
ics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1866 (2001).
98. This fear has been articulated in the criminal context. The so-called “Caldwell Doc-
trine” prohibits attorneys from informing jurors that their verdicts may be reviewed as it
suggest to them that “responsibility . . . rests elsewhere.” See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320, 328–29 (1985); see also Clark, supra note 71, at 2427–28 (discussing the implications of
the Caldwell Doctrine).
99. A similar argument has been made in cases involving non-disclosed summary jury
trials. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 386 (1986) (“If word got
around that some jurors are being fooled into thinking they are deciding cases when they are
not, it could undermine the jury system.”).
100. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 274.
101. See Clark, supra note 71, at 2398.
102. See Clark, supra note 71, at 2401 (stressing an understanding of the jury as a “respon-
sibility taking institution”).
103. See Clark, supra note 71, at 2408–10.
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participation becomes purely perfunctory and the judiciary’s “gra-
tuitous public school”104 is reduced to nothing more than daycare.
C. Non-Disclosed High-Low Agreements Can Be Differentiated from
Seemingly Similar Procedures
Admittedly, high-low agreements are not the only procedural
modifications that are not disclosed to jurors. Three other common
procedures are additur and remittitur, statutory damage caps, and
treble damages. Like high-low agreements, each of these proce-
dures adjusts the jury’s damage award after it has been returned
and does so without the jurors’ knowledge. However, the use of
these procedures is limited to predetermined circumstances and
their non-disclosure is justified by public policy. Accordingly, these
award modification procedures do not pose the same dangers as
non-disclosed high-low agreements.
Additur and remittitur are notable exceptions to the rule that
judges may not reexamine facts already tried by a jury.105 If the jury
returns a damage assessment that is clearly erroneous, the affected
party may move for the court to grant a new trial. The judge may
grant the motion outright or may grant a conditional new trial if
the nonmoving party does not accept an adjusted damage award.106
Remittitur adjusts the damages downward, while additur adjusts it
upward.107 These modification procedures have roots in English
common law108 and have been used in the United States since
1822.109 Additur and remittitur are justified by a concern for the
litigants’ due process rights as well as a desire to preserve judicial
resources by avoiding repetitious adjudication.110 High-low agree-
ments serve a similar function, albeit through private contract. The
litigants insure themselves against an excessive jury award and ap-
pellate litigation by agreeing to limit the scope of their dispute. The
critical difference between these two procedures, however, is that a
104. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 290.
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
106. Judges are more apt to use additur and remittitur if they determine that the only
error in the jury verdict is excessive generosity or penuriousness. Irene Deaville Sann, Remit-
titurs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 157, 164 (1987).
107. Though additur is still employed in some state courts, the practice has been abol-
ished at the federal level. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1935).
108. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at 380.
109. Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass 1822).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59; Lee Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 3–4
(1942) (“The desirability of [remittitur’s] use, to avoid the expense, delay and prolongation
of litigation incident to a new trial, would seem to be beyond controversy.”).
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non-disclosed high-low agreement determines the effect of the
award before the jury returns its verdict. The reasonableness of the
award is not assessed, but merely considered in relation to the se-
cret contract. Therefore, unlike additur and remittitur, non-
disclosed high-low agreements undermine judicial integrity by
preemptively discarding even earnestly-calculated damage awards.
Statutory damage caps are another example of an award modifi-
cation procedure that is not disclosed to jurors.111 Statutory damage
caps are imposed by the legislature and limit the amount of dam-
ages a plaintiff can recover in specific circumstances.112 If a jury
returns an award in excess of this limit, the statute prevents the
plaintiff from any additional recovery above the cap. At first glance,
statutory damage caps are the modification procedure most similar
to high-low agreements. Yet there are three important distinctions.
First, while statutory damages caps are not disclosed to the jury dur-
ing trial, they are nevertheless publicly enacted laws. They are not
secret from the jurors in the way that non-disclosed high-low agree-
ments remain shrouded by the parties. Next, many statutory
damage caps apply only to punitive damages113 and so do not impli-
cate the jury’s fact-finding responsibility. The Supreme Court has
stated that punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are
not questions of fact.114 So, while jurors may feel misled by the non-
disclosure of civil penalty limits, damage caps do not usurp their
role in administering justice in the way that non-disclosed high-low
agreements do. Lastly, non-disclosure of statutory damage caps fur-
thers a rational public policy. Keeping caps undisclosed prevents
the jury from nullifying the statutory limits by overcompensating on
111. Michael S. Kang, Don’t Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The Merits of Nondisclo-
sure, 66 U. CHI L. REV. 469, 469 (1999) (noting that “most courts construe [damage] caps as
rules of law to be applied by the court without jury involvement”).
112. For instance, Congress has passed damage caps on recovery for federal employment
discrimination cases. See Rebecca Holland-Blumoff & Mathew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Igno-
rance About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1364
(2005).
113. There are non-disclosed statutory damage caps that apply to compensatory damages.
The constitutionality of such legislation is heavily contested and raises many concerns, some
of which are not unlike those raised by non-disclosed high-low agreements. For a discussion
of these concerns, see Holland-Blumoff & Bodie, supra note 112, at 1388–98. See also Murphy,
supra note 54, at 402 (arguing that all statutory damage caps are unconstitutional).
114. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001)
(“[T]he level of punitive damages is not really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’ by the jury.”); see also Tull v.
United States., 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (holding that assessment of civil penalties is not a
“fundamental element of a jury trial”).
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those damage charges that remain uncapped by the statute.115 Be-
cause high-low agreements apply to general damages, such strategic
award calibration is not a concern to justify secrecy. Therefore, stat-
utory damage caps do not pose the same hazards of non-disclosed
high-low agreements.
A third, though less common, non-disclosed award modification
procedure is treble damages.116 In this procedure, the court triples
the compensatory damages awarded by the jury without their
knowledge. Like statutory damage caps, however, treble damages
are enacted by legislatures and are therefore not truly kept secret
from jurors. Moreover, the modification procedure applies only in
narrow circumstances where the civil wrong has had market-
manipulating effects, such as in suits for antitrust,117 racketeering,118
and willful patent infringement.119 Treble damage awards are lim-
ited to these circumstances because their unabashed purpose is to
punish the defendant and further the public policy of promoting
market competition.120 Jurors are not made aware of this procedure
for fear that they may calibrate their compensatory damage award
in expectation of its multiplied punitive value.121 Disclosing the
treble damages procedure would thus undermine the limited pub-
lic policy objective behind trebling. Non-disclosed high-low
agreements do not further any such policy objective. Instead, they
privately alter the jury’s adjudicative role to further only the parties’
interests.
Therefore, unlike seemingly similar procedures, non-disclosed
high-low agreements are unique in that they are private contracts
115. See Kang, supra note 111, at 469; see also Sasaki v. Class 92 F3d, 232, 237 (4th Cir.
1996) (noting there was reason to believe the jury calibrated its award in relation to the
damage cap).
116. Most courts hold that the jury should not be instructed that the award will be treb-
led. See, e.g., Heartransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F. 2d 964, 989 n. 21 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). But see Bordonaro Bros. Theaters v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 203 F.2d 676, 678–79 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the jury may be informed of
trebling procedure).
117. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15b–15h (2013).
118. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1964
(2013).
119. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
120. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 88 S.Ct. 1981, 1984 (1968)
(“The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible
than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in
favor of competition.”), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
121. See Heartransfer, 553 F.2d at 989 n. 21; Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d
1081, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 433 U.S. 904 (1977); see also Note, Controlling Jury
Damage Awards in Private Antitrust Suits, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 693, 694–98 (1983) (outlining re-
search demonstrating that disclosing trebling tends to decrease jury awards).
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implementing an unprecedented shift in the adjudicative role of
the jury. Faced with uncertain liability, parties agree to modify their
dispute so as to limit its scope. However, they present their case to
the jury as if this modification has not occurred. The jury is then
secretly tasked with returning the hypothetical value of a dispute
that does not genuinely exist. Under no other circumstances do
courts engage in such a duplicitous procedure. Though at times
courts do withhold information from jurors regarding modifica-
tions of their awards, these instances are limited and established in
either common law or statutory provisions. They are based on care-
ful considerations of judicial fairness and public policy. Non-
disclosed high-low agreements possess no similar credentials. In-
stead, private parties trade their liability exposure in return for the
judiciary’s procedural integrity—a weighty bargain, indeed.
III. DISCLOSURE OF HIGH-LOW AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE REQUIRED
This Part contends that courts should require parties to disclose
high-low agreements to juries. Section III-A argues that despite the
limited case law concerning procedural contracts, the severe delegi-
timizing effects of non-disclosed high-low agreements should
render such agreements unenforceable. Disclosed high-low agree-
ments, on the other hand, are fundamentally distinct from non-
disclosed high-low agreements in that they are do not alter the adju-
dicative role of the jury. Thus, the deleterious effects of non-
disclosure dissipate once the jury is made aware of the high-low
agreement. Section III-B reviews some of the negative conse-
quences of requiring disclosure, such as anchoring or scaling of
damage awards, as well as undue prejudice against the parties. It
argues that these harms can be curbed through effective jury in-
struction and the behavior of the parties themselves. Finally,
Section III-C contends that even if these mitigation techniques are
ineffective, courts should nevertheless require disclosure. It argues
that requiring disclosure is likely to save judicial resources by lessen-
ing the attractiveness of high-low agreements and thereby
promoting complete settlements.
A. Requiring Disclosure Preserves Judicial Legitimacy
In order to preserve judicial legitimacy, courts should require
parties to disclose the existence and terms of high-low agreements.
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Though the case law defining those overriding institutional inter-
ests that may alone invalidate private agreements is limited, the
delegitimizing effects flowing from non-disclosed high-low agree-
ments should prompt courts to mandate disclosure. Once
disclosed, high-low agreements do not pose threats to judicial legiti-
macy because they do not alter the jury’s function. Disclosed high-
low agreements are merely the partial settlements that scholars and
judges have traditionally characterized them as. The jury is no
longer misled and its role in administering justice is left
unmodified.
Today’s courts generally welcome procedural contracts, though
there are exceptions.122 Over the last half-century, courts have rec-
ognized parties’ freedom to enter into a wide array of contracts that
maximize adjudicative efficiency through mutually beneficial proce-
dural arrangements. Parties may agree to waive service of process,
modify the applicable burden of proof, and even choose which le-
gal standards will apply.123 Yet despite this broad autonomy,
procedural contracts are still subject to judicial review. While there
is little case law on point, and even less legislative or judicial direc-
tion, courts and commenters have acknowledged a public policy
exception to the enforcement of contracts that compromise the le-
gitimacy of the judicial system.124
Non-disclosed high-low agreements fall within this important ex-
ception. Though parties are free to waive their right to a jury
trial,125 the jury remains without question a principal player in the
judicial cast. For example, unlike the role of a private arbitrator,
whose purpose reflects her clients’ wants, the jury has the limited
and legally codified function of determining facts in light of appli-
cable law. It is not an infinitely malleable institution. Just as the
judge may not be made by private contract to resolve a dispute by
flipping a coin,126 neither may the jury. Non-disclosed high-low
agreements assign the jury with a similarly flippant undertaking. In-
deed, determining the value of a hypothetical dispute is antithetical
to the jury’s fact-finding procedural role and therefore should not
be tolerated by courts.
122. See Dodge, supra note 32, at 737 (overviewing the courts’ “broad embrace of private
ordering”).
123. See, e.g., Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 36, at 517.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995); United States v.
Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005); LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d
884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Noyes, supra note 16, at 623; Resnik, supra
note 36, at 649.
125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
126. See LaPine Tech. Corp., 130 F.3d at 891 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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This proposed restriction is sensible. As discussed, the delegi-
timizing effects of non-disclosed high-low agreements are
substantial. The prestige of the court is leveraged by risk-adverse
parties to commit an open lie on the jury. The jury’s adjudicative
function is thereby surreptitiously reduced to a role in a private
contract. Still, though such duplicity is the clear effect, parties enter
into high-low agreements with unassuming intentions. Non-dis-
closed high-low agreements benefit parties by providing them with
the legitimacy of a full jury verdict without the unappealing draw-
back of uncertain liability. Parties thereby receive a near risk-free
spin of the judicial wheel—they can have their cake and eat it
too.127 This lopsided arrangement results from the fact that parties
to non-disclosed high-low agreements are generally insulated from
the system-wide externalities they force onto the public.128
Courts can correct this inequity by requiring disclosure. Dis-
closed high-low agreements are fundamentally distinct from non-
disclosed high-low agreements. Whereas non-disclosed high-low
agreements are procedural contracts secretly modifying the adjudi-
cative role of the jury, disclosed agreements simply demarcate the
contractually settled boundaries of the remaining dispute. There is
nothing perverse about high-low agreements once they are dis-
closed. To be sure, litigants are free and even legally required to
confer and negotiate the boundaries of their dispute.129 Just as liti-
gants may stipulate to the veracity of a given fact, taking its
determination out of the hands of the jury, so too might they agree
to constrict the overall value of the dispute through a high-low
agreement. Disclosed high-low agreements are thus akin to tradi-
tional partial settlements, precisely as courts and commenters have
long supposed.130 They are not procedural contracts. Once the
high-low agreement is disclosed to them, the jurors simply perform
their traditional adjudicative function by determining the value of
the dispute as modified.
It is critical, then, that courts require disclosure of both the exis-
tence of high-low agreements and the specific high and low
127. This is the actual title of a practitioners guide article. See Andrea M. Alonso & Kevin
G. Faley, High-Low Agreements: You Can Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too, 2 BRIEF 69 (1999).
128. See Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Per-
spective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1493 (2013) (“When parties agree
to modify procedural rules within adjudication they do not internalize the negative externali-
ties that their agreement produces.”).
129. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) (requiring parties to meet and “consider the nature and
basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the
case”).
130. See supra note 73.
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parameters. The significance of the latter point cannot be under-
stated. The negative effects of non-disclosed high-low agreements
stem from the fact the jury is tasked with resolving a dispute that
does not exist. It is through this fiction that jurors are cheated of
their participatory role and the legitimacy of the judicial system is
compromised. Simply disclosing the existence of a high-low agree-
ment without mention of the predetermined bookends does not
correct this manipulation. The jury would remain blind to the par-
ties’ actual dispute, knowing only that their eyes were veiled.
Requiring complete disclosure would allow the jury to retain its re-
sponsibilities in determining the veracity of facts and the
consequence of their weight in relation to the parties’ modified dis-
pute. The jurors’ time would then no longer be taken for granted
and their expertise no longer abused. And, most importantly, judi-
cial legitimacy would be secured.
B. The Negative Effects of Requiring Disclosure Can Be Mitigated
Although it would benefit both juries and the justice system as a
whole, requiring disclosure of high-low agreements would also carry
negative consequences. Jurors may base their damage awards on
the newly disclosed boundaries instead of carefully weighing the ev-
idence. Jurors may also respond with prejudice against one or both
of the parties by interpreting the agreement itself as an admission
of liability. These undesirable results, however, are not insurmount-
able and can be mitigated. Courts may offer jury instructions to
restrict the evidentiary use and prejudicial effects of the disclosed
values. Likewise, the parties may adjust their contract in expecta-
tion of the jury’s objectionable response or alter their litigation
strategy all together.
The jury’s knowledge of the high-low parameters will almost cer-
tainly affect the amount of damages they award. This is due to
anchoring and scaling effects. Anchoring is a psychological phe-
nomenon in which the first number presented to a decision-maker
has a demonstrable effect on her ultimate decision.131 For example,
empirical research suggests that when jurors learn of statutory dam-
age caps, they adjust their damage award in relation to the cap.132
131. See Amos Tvesky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).
132. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The
Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 367 (1999); Michael J. Saks et
al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 251 (1997).
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This results in either a devaluation or inflation of the awarded dam-
ages, irrespective of the evidence presented.133 There is no reason
to believe jurors’ responses to disclosed high-low agreements would
be distinct from jurors’ responses to statutory damage caps. Indeed,
studies have shown that the anchoring effect can occur even when
subjects believe that the presented numbers are randomly gener-
ated.134 This suggests that anchoring would almost certainly occur if
the jurors knew that the numbers were contractually settled. Jurors
may additionally use the disclosed high and low parameters as a
scale for calculating damages. Like anchoring, scaling is a psycho-
logical effect in which individuals calibrate responses in relation to
the presentation of possible choices.135 Faced with specific values,
jurors may believe that awarding the highest amount is warranted
only in instances of the most egregious behavior and adjust their
award accordingly.136 Because of these two psychological effects, dis-
closing high-low parameters reduces the likelihood that a jury
would return a maximum or minimum verdict irrespective of the
strength of the parties’ evidence.
Additionally, disclosure of high-low agreements may result in un-
due prejudice against one or both of the disputants. The jury may
understand the existence of the high-low agreement as an admis-
sion of the weakness or strength of a given parties’ argument. They
may also understand the agreement itself to be an implicit admis-
sion of liability. From the layman’s point of view, why would
someone agree to pay or forfeit any sum of money if there was not
at least some truth to the accusations? In fact, these very real con-
cerns animate Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That rule
prohibits parties from presenting evidence of compromise offers
and negotiations “to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
disputed claim.”137 Importantly, Rule 408 is a narrow rule and does
not prohibit disclosure of private agreements for purposes not ex-
plicitly prohibited.138 Therefore, Rule 408 would not apply to
disclosure of high-low agreements for the purpose of presenting
the jury with an accurate portrayal of the existing dispute. Still, dis-
closure of high-low agreements implicates the same concerns
133. Id.
134. Tvesky & Kahneman, supra note 131, at 1125.
135. See Norbert Schwarz et al., Response Scale: Effects of Category Range on Reported Behavior
and Comparative Judgments, 49 PUB. OP. Q. 388, 389 (1985).
136. See Holland-Blumoff & Bodie, supra note 112, at 1382 (describing this psychological
“conversation[ ]” in the context of statutory damage caps).
137. FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
138. See FED. R. EVID. 408(b) (stating that the court may admit evidence of compromises
and negotiations for purposes not explicitly prohibited by the rule).
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justifying Rule 408’s prohibition, and, thus, parties’ fears of poten-
tial prejudice are not at all unreasonable.
Though these potential detriments are serious, they can be miti-
gated by courts and by the parties themselves. First, as in all
instances in which a jury is likely to consider evidence for both a
permissible and impermissible purpose, the court should offer the
jury a limiting instruction.139 Such an instruction would explain that
although the high-low agreement limits the potential valuation of
the dispute, it has no bearing on the veracity of the complaint and
does not reflect a maximum or minimum degree of liability. The
court may also inform the jury that high-low agreements are com-
mon practice and are designed by parties with the intention to buy
peace rather than concede liability. Admittedly, the effectiveness of
such limiting instructions may be less than satisfactory, as it has
been documented that jurors often misunderstand, forget, or out-
right ignore courtroom instructions.140 But, to use juror
shortcomings to justify nondisclosure is to succumb to cynicism.
The American judicial system presumes that jurors comprehend
courtroom instructions and depends on their ability to do so.141
Moreover, the boundaries of high-low agreements are unlikely to
inflame jurors’ emotions or prove so complicated that jurors would
be incapable of limiting their evidentiary application.142 Well-
crafted jury instructions could therefore help steer the jury away
from psychological biases and toward the fair and accurate resolu-
tion of the parties’ remaining dispute.
The parties themselves may also take proactive steps to limit dis-
closure’s undesirable consequences. A rule requiring disclosure
would not curtail parties’ autonomy to shape their dispute and limit
their liability exposure through the use of high-low agreements. It
139. FED. R. EVID. 105.
140. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understanda-
ble: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1306–11 (1979). But see
David Alan Sklanksy, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 416
(2013) (arguing that while jurors may not be capable of forgetting evidence once it is dis-
closed, they are capable of disregarding it or limiting its purpose).
141. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (noting that “[t]he rule that
juries are presumed to follow their instructions” is problematic, but rooted in the belief that
it represents “a reasonable practical accommodation” of the parties’ interests).
142. Cf. Laura Gaston Dooley, Essay, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics
of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 337 (1995) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence rest
on an assumption that the judge must protect the jury from certain evidence lest the jurors
allow their emotional reaction to overpower their intellectual obligation to decide the case
according to the judge’s instructions.”); see also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 123 (Atheneum 1963) (1949) (noting that rules of exclusion
“have been perpetuated primarily because of the admitted incompetence of jurors”).
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would simply force the parties to change the way that they ap-
proached negotiating the agreement. For instance, if the parties are
concerned that psychological effects like anchoring and scaling or
prejudice will affect the juries’ damage assessment, they can
preemptively adjust the ceiling or the floor to correct for distortion.
Such a corrective measure would not defeat the purpose of high-
low agreements. As Professor J.J. Prescott and his colleagues
demonstrate through economic analysis, one of the primary bene-
fits of high-low agreements is that they allow mutually optimistic
parties to “reduce[ ] the risk premiums they bear . . . while still
allowing them to benefit from their confidence.”143 Requiring dis-
closure would preserve this jointly beneficial speculation, as it
would simply change the assessments that parties must make.
If the parties determine that disclosure would nevertheless prove
overly prejudicial, there are a host of alternative procedural ar-
rangements in which high-low agreements may remain undisclosed
without resulting in systemic harm. For instance, parties may agree
to present the jury with only the question of liability. If the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, then the ceiling would
be awarded, whereas, if they returned a verdict in favor of the de-
fendant, then the floor would be awarded. In disputes involving
sufficiently unpredictable damages, such an agreement would re-
sult in an outcome not dissimilar to a standard non-disclosed high-
low agreement. Additionally, parties may instead choose to pursue
forms of alternative dispute resolution. External procedural systems
commonly utilize non-disclosed high-low agreements and would
welcome the parties’ arbitration fees.144 And finally, for those par-
ties unwilling to eschew public tribunals, many states are beginning
to offer what have been generally termed ‘expedited jury trials.’ Ex-
pedited jury trials are similar to traditional public trials except that
the parties litigate their case rapidly, such that an outcome is
reached in a single day.145 Non-disclosed high-low agreements have
become fixtures in expedited jury trials,146 and some states even
have statutes explicitly prohibiting disclosing the agreement to the
143. See Prescott et al., supra note 6, at 701, 729–30.
144. See, e.g., Scott S. Morrisson, Consider Binding Arbitration to Resolve Your Next Dispute,
RES GESTAE, May 1997, at 18, 22.
145. See generally Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Short, Summary and Expedited: The Evolution of
Civil Jury Trials, National Center for State Courts (2012), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/
media/Files/PDF/Information%20and%20Resources/Civil%20cover%20sheets/ShortSum
maryExpedited-online%20rev.ashx.
146. See Steven Croley, Summary Jury Trials in Charleston County, South Carolina, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1585, 1612 (2008) (noting that virtually every case tried by summary jury in
Charleston County involves a high-low agreement).
840 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:3
jury.147 Therefore, while requiring disclosure of high-low agree-
ments might in some ways limit the procedures available to parties,
there remain alternative arrangements for parties to realize the
benefits of non-disclosed high-low agreements while still assuring
judicial legitimacy.
C. Requiring Disclosure May Preserve Judicial Resources
Even if the suggested mitigation techniques are not able to en-
tirely protect parties from the unwanted consequences of
disclosure, courts should still require parties to reveal their high-low
agreements. While there exists an overarching judicial policy in
promoting settlement agreements, this policy is informed by a de-
sire to avoid the expense of unneeded trials. High-low agreements
further no such interest. Instead, they promote litigation by lessen-
ing the parties’ risks attendant to pursuing adjudication. Disclosure
would likely save judicial resources by limiting the advantages of
non-disclosed high-low agreements and thereby encouraging par-
ties to completely settle their disputes.
Courts welcome high-low agreements in accordance with the
broad public policy of promoting private dispute resolution.148 This
preference for external settlements permeates everything from the
rules of procedure and evidence to appellate opinions and judicial
scholarship.149 But this is not because of an altruistic longing for
harmony. Rather, settlements are facilitated and encouraged be-
cause they avoid the expense of adjudication.150 Trials are
expensive and dockets are full; there is an abundance of lawyers
147. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 630.01(b), 630.03; NY R SUFFOLK SJT RULE 2. Non-
disclosure of the agreement under these circumstances is perhaps less concerning than in
ordinary trials, as the proceedings are already dramatically altered and limited. Still, expe-
dited jury trials differ dramatically between jurisdictions and may themselves pose unique
concerns that have yet to be studied.
148. See, e.g., Barton v. Dep’t of Transp., 308 P.3d 597, 605 (Wash. 2013) (stating that
high-low agreements further the public policy to “encourage out-of-court settlements”); In re
Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Amchem Products Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 717, 723 (2007) (as-
sessing high-low agreements in light of the “State’s public policy of encouraging the
expeditious settlement of claims”); Monti v. Wenkert, 947 A.2d 261, 276 (Conn. 2008) (not-
ing high-low agreements serve the public policy of “encouraging parties to settle their
disputes and to avoid protracted litigation”).
149. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 2.
150. See, e.g., In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1029 (“Settlement is generally favored because it
conserves scarce judicial resources.”); Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 3–4; Margaret
M.Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 36 (1996).
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and a dearth of judges.151 These economic and administrative con-
cerns animate various procedural rules, for instance, the
aforementioned evidentiary rule prohibiting admission of compro-
mise offers.152 The generally articulated fear is that if litigants were
made at trial to confront their settlements, they would be less likely
to entertain discussions or enter into agreements.153 The antici-
pated result would be fewer private settlements and an increase in
costly public adjudication.
But, this policy and its economic rationale do not apply to high-
low agreements. Though the empirical data is inconclusive on
whether or not high-low agreements ultimately preserve parties’ re-
sources,154 there is reason to believe that high-low agreements
promote litigation by lowering the cost and risk of going to trial.155
It is the fear of an uncertain jury verdict that drives parties to settle
their disputes.156 Yet with high-low agreements in place, litigants are
no longer concerned with the dangers of a jackpot verdict or a jury
snub. They are sure of their overall liability exposure. By lowering
the costs and increasing the certainty of trial, high-low agreements
invite to the courthouse disputants who might have otherwise de-
cided to privately resolve their disputes. In fact, high-low
agreements are most often used in cases involving potentially large
damages and uncertain liability,157 the kinds of cases that would
likely settle if not for the safety blanket of the high-low
agreement.158
Mandating that parties disclose their high-low agreements will
likely result in an overall increase in private settlements and a re-
duction in public trials. Once the agreement is disclosed, litigants
are no longer able to receive a near risk-free jury consultation on
the value of their unmodified dispute. Furthermore, they face the
potential risk that jurors will be unable or unwilling to follow the
courts’ limiting instruction on the permissible evidentiary uses of
151. Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 2–4.
152. FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
153. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
154. See Prescott et al., supra note 6, at 729–30 (noting that while in theory high-low
agreements may cause parties to reduce their litigation expenditure, empirical data demon-
strates no consistent differences in monthly litigation expenses between claims with a high-
low agreement in place and all others).
155. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 62 (noting that high-low agreements make “trial
less scary, which might encourage more parties to take their chances and try it”); Yeazell,
supra note 5, at 197 (describing high-low agreements as “insurance against a catastrophic
verdict”).
156. See id.
157. See John L. Shanahan, The High-Low Agreement, FOR THE DEFENSE, July 1991, at 27.
158. For a discussion on the factors that affect the likelihood of settlement, see generally
Gross & Syverud, supra note 5, at 46–61.
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the contract. These detriments would make high-low agreements
less appealing to litigants and may curtail their frequent use. It is
therefore not unreasonable to predict that a rule requiring disclo-
sure would keep some cases out of already overcrowded dockets
and preserve judicial resources.159
Disclosure is certainly a double-edged sword. Though informing
juries of high-low agreements would secure judicial legitimacy, it
would also pose reasonable concerns for the litigants. While the
aforementioned mitigation techniques should quash many of these
worries, some may persist. This is not necessarily undesirable. Man-
dating disclosure is likely to prompt out-of-court settlements, thus
furthering the public policy of judicial resourcefulness. To be clear,
this is not an invitation for jurisdictions to adopt unfair procedural
rules solely to promote settlements. Nevertheless, courts should not
compromise their integrity by allowing parties to mislead jurors out
of an overzealous commitment to party autonomy and private set-
tlements. And this is especially true in the case of non-disclosed
high-low agreements, which undermine the economic rationale
that motivates courts to promote settlements in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Americans enjoy broad autonomy in selecting the procedures
governing their disputes. However, this freedom does not stretch so
far as to permit choices that compromise judicial legitimacy. Non-
disclosed high-low agreements do just that. When undisclosed to
jurors, high-low agreements effectuate a dramatic procedural shift.
Parties that have settled on the possible outcomes of their dispute
present their case to the jury and ask for it to be resolved as if the
potential relief is boundless. In this way, jurors are misled and
tasked with resolving a purely hypothetical dispute. The answer the
jury returns carries no real weight and is appreciated only in rela-
tion to the parties’ furtive contract. This is a fundamental
transformation of the jury’s procedural role. It is also a deceptive
abuse of jurors’ time and expertise. Non-disclosed high-low agree-
ments thus undermine the procedural legitimacy of the judicial
system and reduce the social and political benefits of jury service.
And, while there is very limited judicial or legislative direction on
how to cabin litigants’ procedural autonomy, those agreements that
159. See id., at 62 (“The availability of [high-low agreements] . . . will tend to discourage
full settlements and to facilitate trials.”).
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compromise judicial legitimacy should not be enforced. By mandat-
ing disclosure, courts can eschew these delegitimizing effects. Once
they are made known to the jury, high-low agreements simply mark
the boundaries of the dispute. The jury’s role in determining facts
and effectuating outcomes is left undisturbed. Although requiring
disclosure may adversely affect the parties, these negative conse-
quences can be alleviated by jury instruction or litigation strategy.
The parties may also choose to avoid trial altogether. Disclosing
high-low agreements would thus maintain the autonomy of the par-
ties to craft creative settlement arrangements while protecting the
integrity of the judiciary.

